The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...) threads of moral discourse, made in turn of other interwoven threads, including transmission of shared codes, appeals to reform of prevailing custom, rational argument about the justification of some precept on the basis of some shared general teaching or principle, and rational argument about the ultimate basis for principles and justification of authoritative teaching. That is, the approach adopted to the reading of ethical texts depends on a firm belief in the fact that philosophers hardly created any ethical doctrine out of nothing. The main point this book tries to highlight is how different philosophical theories emerged and followed each other as a result of attempts at accounting for what was going on in the world of moral traditions. Changes were propelled by controversies between different schools, and highly abstract arguments were the unintended effects of moves made by controversialists forced to transform (and occasionally to turn upside down) their own doctrines in order to face the challenge posed by other arguments. This is the reason why the book examines not only texts that already enjoy pride of place in the history of philosophy (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), but also other texts usually treated in the histories of religions (the Bible, the Talmud, the Quran), and others considered to be much less philosophical (Plutarchus, Pufendorf). -/- 1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism. Two different traditions of morality in VI-V century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates answer to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy. Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistence in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The chapter illustrates then the relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater familias, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexis, or ‘disposition’. Prudence, or better practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with bouleusis or deliberation is examined, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a way of life. The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. -/- 4. Epicurus and ethics as self-care. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of a science of well-being aiming, more than at pleasure as in the popular view, at reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. Cicero is treated, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is chosen as the best example of what the Stoic tradition could yield, an art of living based on sophisticated introspection, in turn aimed at making a kind of cognitive therapy possible, dismantling obnoxious passions at their root by systematically correcting false representations. -/- 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism. A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torā (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Leviticus is stressed as the turning point when emphasis mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, is combined with the legal tradition, yielding the change in sensibility of the Second Temple time. Philo of Alexandria is described as one of the three leading figures – together with Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Yeshua – at the apex the emergence of the mentioned new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, two eventually identical precepts whose meaning is arguably more sober and sensible than the long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine has made us believe and no novelty vis-à-vis so-called Ancient-Testament teachings. -/- 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism. The first section examines the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirqé Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deòt, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexeis and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was ‘the tool by which the world was built’; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous , but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure Judaism. The third section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manichaeism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. The last section summarizes the turbulent history of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and a few topics from the Stoic-Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua had been influenced by cynic preachers, is a proof of the necessity felt by Christian preachers to translate the original ‘Christian’ teaching into a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where an early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 8. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism. The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. Al-Farabi wrote an enjoyable remake of the Platonic Republic, arguing that the citizen’s virtues were the basis on which the political building needs to rest. The secular lawgiver is enlightened by the light of reason in his everyday practice of governance, but room is made for the Prophet as the voice of revealed truth that confirms and completes the rational truth that philosophy may afford. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 9. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelian ethics. The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place a first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed just less striking traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Torah and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirké Avot could be translated. -/- 10. Thomas Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics. In the first section the fresh start is described of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium. In a first phase, Anselm and Peter Abelard built on a Platonic and Augustinian legacy. In this phase. remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. Aquinas’s ethics is a theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract a self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave "pure nature" incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones, such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too demanding and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Ia-IIae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas could reduce the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethic, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is not ethical ‘absolutism’, as both traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularist enemies of dogmatic morality tend to believe. It is instead an ethic of prudential judgment. Exceptions to this approach – or better results of logical fallacies – are such claims as the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts", claims that simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences Thomas did not live long enough to draw or was not consistent enough to dare to draw. -/- 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry. The first topic illustrated is the discussion about the notion of pura natura, namely the human condition after the original sin and before divine revelation. The core notion was already there in Aquinas but was later developed by Caietanus (Thomas de Vio) with a number of interesting implications: firstly a view of human nature as such much more positive than Augustine’s and his followers’ view, including both Calvinists and Jansenists; secondly, the implication that the philosopher’s morality, as opposed to the Christian’s morality, is a quite respectable kind of morality; thirdly, that theocracy and prosecution of the unfaithful lacked justification, with more far-fetching consequences than Aquinas himself had dared to draw. The second topic is casuistry, a new name for a comparatively older way of thinking, which was already there in late Stoicism and Cicero as well as in the Talmudic literature. This is an approach aimed at yielding probable enough solutions for doubtful cases even in absence of completely safe staring points. The genre developed from medieval reference books for confessors and became by the sixteenth-century a sophisticated tool-box for dealing with various fields of applied ethics. Francisco Vitoria, the main authority of Baroque Scholasticism, was a controversial figure, among the proponents of the new discipline of casuistry and a consistent proponent of more separation between the religious and the civil authority, stricter limits to the legitimacy of war, innate rights of non-Christian nations in the New World based on the notion of pura natura, providing a standard of ‘natural’ goodness, previous to revelation, on which the Indian nations were judged to live in a naturally good condition, provided with the institutions of family, justice, and religion had accordingly a right to full respect by Christian sovereigns. Bartolomé de Las Casas, arguing along similar lines, was the leader of a historical battle in defence of the rights of the Indios. -/- 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living. A short description of one of the Renaissance Phyrronism, one of the classical philosophies revived in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Montaigne combines the sceptical epistemology with an understanding of ethics – indeed of philosophy as a whole – in terms of an art of living inspired by two basic ideas, sagesse, that is, practical wisdom as the only kind of rationality available after theology, science, and tradition have declared bankrupt, and an aesthetic ideal of self-transformation through the art of writing and introspection. -/- 13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism. The chapter illustrates first the vicissitudes of Augustinianism newly born after the late medieval triumph of Thomist Aristotelianism in the alternative Protestant and Catholic versions processed by the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Then it illustrates the doctrines of Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal’s best disciple, on the impossibility of introspection, on the ubiquity of self-deception, on the incurably evil character of the passion of love, and on the two moralities, the one of the man of the world, the morality of honesty which is indispensable for granting peace and order but devoid of any true value for eternal salvation, since the same external behaviour may be prompted by opposite motivations, and the morality of charity, the only true one but also useless to society. The third topic is Pierre Malebranche’s view of self-deception as a ubiquitous phenomenon accounting for human action and responsibility and his reformulated theory of self-love, no less ubiquitous than for Nicole and yet not as incurably evil, given the distinction between morally indifferent and even necessary amour de soi and vicious amour proper, a distinction on which the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political theory rests. -/- 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality. The chapter is dedicated to the discovery of the idea of a ‘new moral science’. Hugo Grotius is discussed first highlighting the real character of his project, much closer to the Thomist idea of a natural law accessible to non-corrupted human reason when human beings are living in a state of pura natura. Then Hobbes’s combination of scepticism, voluntarism, and conventionalism is described and both the continuity with Grotius’s new science, in the search for non-revealed rational morality, and the break with him, in the adoption of voluntarism and refusal of an intellectualist view of natural law, are illustrated. Pufendorf’s work is illustrated as a synthesis of the two previous attempts and the – up to Schneewind underestimated – paradigmatic example of the new science of morality. -/- 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism. The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number possible sets of laws on a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world. 16. Richard Price and intuitionism. The chapter describes first the doctrines of the Cambridge Platonists, an example of hyper-rationalist reaction to Calvinism. Secondly it describes the sophisticated and universally ignored – from Sidgwick to Anscombe –version of what was later labelled ‘ethical intuitionism’ – showing how it escapes familiar objections and misrepresentations of intuitionism – from Mill to Rawls – in grounding its argument on transcendental arguments while carefully avoiding recourse to introspection and psychological evidence, which has been taken as a too easy target by critics of intuitionism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses Whewell’s ‘philosophy of morality’, as opposed to ‘systematic morality’, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such rational truths but requires consideration of the ongoing dialectics between idea and fact in historically given moralities. Whewell’s intuitionism turns out closer to Kantian ethics than commentators have made us believe until now, and quite different from what Sidgwick meant by intuitionism. -/- 17. Adam Smith and the morality of role-switch. The chapter describes first, Hutcheson’s attempt at basing the ‘new science’ of natural law on different bedrock than Pufendorf and the English Platonists, namely a moral sense, a faculty whose existence is assumed to be proved on an empirical basis. The second step is a reconstruction of Hume’s rejoinder in terms of a new science of man including morality on an ‘experimental’ basis, that is, a ‘Newtonian’ hypothetical-deductive approach, distinguished from Hutcheson’s allegedly uncritical descriptive approach to human nature. The third step is a reconstruction of Adam Smith theory of morality understood as emerging from a spontaneous interplay of exchanges of situations (the most basic meaning of the word ‘sympathy’ as construed by this author). -/- 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. The Enlightenment spirit that suggested the idea of a new morality, free from religion, is illustrated. The notion of utility is illustrated as well as the subsequent formulations of the principle of utility. The idea of felicific calculus is discussed, showing how its inner difficulties prompted several reformulations of the principle of utility in order to avoid undesirable implications of proposed formulations. The role of the thesis of spontaneous convergence between interest and duty is discussed, showing how it left numberless questions open, and the distinction between the virtues of prudence, justice and beneficence is described as a way out of the deadlocks of classical utilitarianism. After Bentham, Mill’s reformed utilitarianism is reconstructed, showing how it is a kind of mixed system – as closer to common sense as it gives up Bentham’s claims to consistency and simplicity – resulting as unintended consequences from the controversies in which Mill was too keen to engage. The hidden agenda of the controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image of the battle between Prejudice and Reason, is described, showing how both competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. -/- 19. Immanuel Kant, practical reason and judgment. The chapter argues that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an ‘empirical moral philosophy’ or moral anthropology including treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life. -/- 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the critique of abstract universalism. The chapter describes first the Romantic movement and the implications some of its concerns, rescuing passions, community, tradition, the individual as the bearer of a unique destiny, and the longing for organic unity between the individual, mankind and nature. Hegel’s contribution is discussed then, highlighting how, on the one hand, he shared a number of these concerns and on the other he had more rationalist leanings. The notion of morality is the pivotal point of the reconstruction, highlighting how Hegel construes this notion as a key to his own diagnosis of the malaise of modernity – the separation of individual and Gemeinschaft – and how his attack on Kant turns around this very idea. -/- 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment. The chapter illustrates first the idea of deconstruction of the back-world of values. Nietzsche claims to be legitimate heir of the French moralists, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in so far as he allegedly carries out to its deepest implications their discovery of what lies behind traditional naïve belief in the existence of an objective realm of values just waiting for description by the philosopher. The two exemplars form which genealogy draws inspiration are the classical philologist’s historical reconstructions of lost meanings and the chemist’s decomposition of elements. Then the genealogy of the notions of good and evil carried out in the first dissertation of Genealogy of morals is illustrated with its paradoxical conclusion that will to power is in fact the only ‘genuine’ kind of goodness. The third point illustrated is the dialectic of ascetism and self-realization with its ambiguous outcome. The suggested interpretation of such outcome is that Nietzsche’s normative ethics is a kind of virtue ethics taking an aesthetic ideal as a normative standard -/- 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism. The chapter discusses the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences to reach, also in ethics, the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of the intuitionist philosophers, was what was worth considering as the expression of intuitionist ethics. In spite of a naïve positivist starting-point, Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus, Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a “new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. Then it reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, should be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. -/- 23. Edmund Husserl and the a-priori of action. The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl’s project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the a priori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy carried out in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach’s theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that basically sketches the very ideas ‘discovered’ later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section is dedicated to Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of ‘values’ – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler who claimed to Husserl’s legitimate heirs. -/- 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism. The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of ‘good’, its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with ‘emotive’ meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell’s ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of a rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson’s theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. Last of all, the discussion from the Forties about Hume’s law is described, mentioning Karl Popper’s argument and Richard Hare’s early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics. The chapter discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. A short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current is given trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot’s and Peter Geach’s critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre’s grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism. The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick’s and Moore’s fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine definitely refuted. A glimpse at this uproarious process is given through two examples. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of Utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This results in preference utilitarianism combined with a ‘Kantian’ version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare’s two-level preference utilitarianism where act utilitarianism plays the function of eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of action-guiding practical device. -/- 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy. The post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named ‘Rehabilitation of practical philosophy’ is described. Among the actors of such rehabilitation there were a few of Heidegger’s most brilliant disciples, and Hans-Georg Gadamer is chosen as a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle’s lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger’s lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the central role of the notion of phronesis. -/- 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics. Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This started, instead than the rehabilitation of prudence, with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. An examination of his argument is some detail is offered, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas’s elaboration on Apel’s theory. -/- 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics. Rawls’s distinction between a “political” and a “metaphysical” approach to one central part of ethical theory, namely the theory of justice, is interpreted as a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and neo-casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter, namely that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls’ view never will be close – on the basic criteria for judgment. -/- 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics. The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin’s new casuistry. -/- . (shrink)

L'histoire de l'interprétation des Ps 42-43 se révèle être une véritable Wirkungsgeschichte qui, dans l'évolution des méthodes de lecture, permet de percevoir la force d'une Parole Vivante, toujours actualisée dans les différentes époques de l'exégèse. Même dans la coexistence de tendances non parfaitement homogènes, on peut discerner deux orientations principales: une interprétation mystique et christologique, à partir des reprises néotestamentaires de ces psaumes, a cédé progressivement le pas, à partir des Maîtres Juifs du XIe siècle et de la Renaissance, à (...) une lecture toujours plus attentive aux questions philologiques/littéraires ainsi qu'à l'expérience du psalmiste et de son peuple. L'étude de ces différents horizons interprétatifs se révèle d'un grand intérêt aujourd'hui, lorsque l'on cherche une nouvelle herméneutique, qui permette à la Parole de «parler» encore. (shrink)

Video barbam et pallium, philosophum nondum videoAulo Gellio, Noctes Atticae, IX, 2, 4 1 Lo scenario Immaginiamo che il direttore di un grande museo venga a sapere che uno dei più grandi e riconosciuti maestri dell’arte contemporanea - anch’egli immaginario, chiamiamolo per comodità D’Auchan — ha lasciato in eredità a qualcuno, diciamo un oscuro collezionista, una grande quantità di opere del tutto inedite e completamente ignote anche alla critica, che il fortunato beneficiario ha deciso infi...

"Gregorio Piaia si è formato presso l'Università di Padova, dove si laureò il 17 febbraio 1968 con una tesi coordinata da Carlo Giacon sul tema dell'averroismo politico nel pensiero di Marsilio da Padova. Tra i suoi maestri è da ricordare ancora Giovanni Santinello, del quale fu il principale collaboratore nel guidare il gruppo di lavoro formato da giovani studiosi impegnati nel progetto di una grande Storia delle storie generali della filosofia, uscita in prima edizione in lingua italiana tra (...) il 1979 e il 2004 ed ora in corso di traduzione e aggiornamento in lingua inglese. La vita "pubblica" di Piaia si è svolta essenzialmente nella sua funzione di professore universitario, all'inizio come docente in formazione presso l'Università di Padova, poi quale professore associato presso l'Università di Verona, infine dal 1987 di nuovo a Padova, dove in qualità di professore ordinario tenne per quasi trent'anni la cattedra di storia della filosofia. Padova, Verona, il Veneto: certamente questi sono stati i riferimenti territoriali entro i quali si è compiuta la carriera accademica del bellunese Piaia. Ma egli estese ben presto l'ambito della sua attività di docente oltre questi limiti geografici, in Europa e nelle Americhe. Lo stesso spirito di apertura ha animato l'attività scientifica di Gregorio Piaia, che non si è svolta in limiti territoriali o di scuola precisi ma all'interno di una vasta "repubblica delle lettere" dai contorni più internazionali che nazionali: ne è testimonianza il suo ruolo di direttore o redattore di importanti riviste e la sua presenza nelle più rilevanti società di promozione degli studi filosofici e storico-filosofici. Non meno degna di nota, infine, è la sua costante attenzione e disponibilità nei confronti dei giovani studiosi. Il presente volume intende essere modesto segno della stima di cui gode e dell'ampiezza dei suoi interessi di ricerca." --Contratapa. (shrink)

Esiste un confine certo tra vita e morte? Il volume ripercorre, con un approccio transculturale, la storia della definizione di morte e le vicende connesse alle tecniche di accertamento del decesso dall'antichità ai giorni nostri. Da sempre, infatti, medici, filosofi e teologi si sono sforzati di individuare il momento preciso dell'exitus, l'istante in cui, secondo la tradizione, l'anima avrebbe lasciato il corpo. Nondimeno, soglie e parametri stabiliti da una generazione furono spesso posti in discussione e ridisegnati dalla successiva. Alimentato (...) dai successi conseguiti nelle tecniche rianimative e nella trapiantologia, il dibattito ha conosciuto una fase di grande vivacità proprio negli ultimi decenni, tanto che, pur avendo in genere abbandonato - o, perlomeno, ridimensionato - considerazioni su principi metafisici, la definizione di morte appare ancor oggi come un oggetto di negoziazione scientifica e bioetica. (shrink)

Scritto complesso, compatto e volutamente non sistematico - all'acme della carriera accademica e dell'attività filosofica di Robert Spaemann (1927 - 2018) -, Persone. Sulla differenza tra 'qualcosa' e 'qualcuno' (1996) non è solo un capolavoro del grande pensatore tedesco, ma è innanzitutto una pietra miliare nella filosofia del Novecento sul realismo delle persone. La sua acuta riflessione sa pro-vocare e destare l'uomo di oggi alla 'grande questione' ch'egli da sempre è a se stesso, ponendolo di fronte al senso (...) autentico del suo essere-persona che, dentro i drammi e i rinnegamenti delle persone reali e dentro le traversìe della storia è stato prima obliato dal modo d'esistere dell'uomo moderno, per poi scorrere come fiume carsico nei meandri della travagliata storia della personologia, con un concomitante imporsi, nella forma mentis oggi imperante, della 'dialettica di naturalismo e spiritualismo'. Si offre qui uno studio rigoroso e inedito della filosofia delle persone di Spaemann - miniera ricchissima tutta da scavare -, che prende sul serio la domanda esistenzialmente decisiva sull'enigma della persona, per arrischiare una comprensione della realtà personale che ognuno di noi è, lasciandoci guidare dal 'Socrate tedesco' in un avvincente percorso che raccoglie a piene mani l'eredità e le sfide della tradizione filosofica e restituisce al lettore precisi segnavìa del senso, cioè della vettorialità fondamentale tracciata nell'essere-persona e, resi memori dell'origine e della meta, del senso di marcia a ognuno di noi affidato come compito per divenire le persone uniche che già siamo e sempre più saremo. (shrink)

In quale rapporto sono oggi storia e memoria e in che modo esse agiscono nel discorso pubblico? Per comprenderlo bisogna analizzare il grande spazio che la memoria ha conquistato negli ultimi anni, mettendo al centro dell’attenzione pubblica il Novecento, come secolo tragico, e la Shoah. E interrogarsi sulla necessità di aprire una fase di riflessione più ampia sulle politiche della violenza agite tra Otto e Novecento dagli Stati in tutto il mondo, in primo luogo sul colonialismo. Un percorso (...) che, solo, può consentire di ritrovare un giusto rapporto con la storia. (shrink)

I quattro Studi qui raccolti trattano alcuni temi significativi della filosofia settecentesca: il rapporto anima-corpo in Swedenborg, la presenza o meno di un livello di ragione nell' Homme naturel di Rousseau, la convergenza o meno di radicalismo politico e dimensione religiosa in Mably e in Morelly, la fondazione della scienza economica in Genovesi. Sono saggi molto diversi che sottendono interessi differenziati e stili di pensiero non collimanti; essi, tuttavia, sono accomunati da un'ottica squisitamente storiografica, che, pur nella consapevolezza di una (...) tensione tra presente e passato, tende a cogliere l'autonomia di quest'ultimo, la sua resistenza ad ogni schematizzazione, il suo sfuggire ad ogni tentativo di irrigidimento in immagini definitive. Il quadro del Settecento che emerge da questo volume da un lato mette in luce le diverse articolazioni che la filosofia settecentesca assume nei diversi contesti "nazionali" europei, dall'altro ne sottolinea slanci ma anche ambiguità e incoerenze, confermando quella grande complessità culturale dell' "età dei lumi" delineata dalla storiografia più recente. (shrink)

In questo studio sono pubblicate alcune lettere inedite, conservate nella Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire di Ginevra, risalenti agli anni 1669-1678, scambiate tra Jean-Robert Chouet e Claude Pajon. Grazie all’apporto di questi due protagonisti delle accademie di Saumure di Ginevra è possibile meglio intendere, nella complessità dei riferimenti e delle sfumature, le soluzioni relative al tema della libertà divina nell’opera della creazione e della redenzione, argomento di grande interesse nella speculazione filosofica e teologica del Seicento. Si tratta di documenti preziosi, (...) in particolare per la storia della filosofia cartesiana, in quanto il confronto critico, che verte soprattutto sulle tesi di Cartesio concernenti la volontà divina e umana, offre a Chouet l’opportunità di intervenire a chiarire, contro riduttive letture volontaristiche, il significato della dottrina cartesiana della «volonté souveraine et independante de Dieu». (shrink)

È sufficiente scorrere le primissime pagine del volume _Lumières de l’Utopie_ per toccare con mano i nessi, profondi anche se non del tutto esplicitati, che legano la storiografia di Bronislaw Baczko a quel grande processo di rinnovamento metodologico degli studi storici che oggi siamo abituati a definire «linguistic turn». Il contributo si propone appunto di approfondire questo specifico aspetto del lavoro dello storico polacco, soffermandosi in particolare sul contributo che la sua visione della storia del moderno «discorso utopistico» (...) ha offerto ad una più profonda e consapevole comprensione delle conflittuali vicende della modernizzazione europea. (shrink)

L’indagine sui moderni processi di ideologizzazione ha assunto un ruolo centrale nel dibattito contemporaneo sul Novecento come «epoca degli estremi». Tra le più originali e interessanti linee di ricostruzione dei concreti presupposti storici di tale fenomeno occorre senz’altro annoverare la direttrice di studi e ricerche sviluppatasi in Germania nel grande laboratorio della Begriffsgeschichte. Muovendo dalla seminale riflessione di Otto Brunner sull’«epoca delle ideologie», l’articolo si sofferma in particolare sulle originali modalità di concettualizzazione del tema nella riflessione storiografica di Reinhart (...) Koselleck e sugli esiti da esse prodotte nel grande impianto lessico- grafico dei Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to open the space for a dabate between political theory and psychoanalysis, by starting from the problematisation of some of the most fundamental concepts offered by the analytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Through the analysis of key-Lacanian categories like symbolic structure, big Other, object a, symptom, the article exposes the main misunderstandings that characterise the work of many contemporary political theorists and psychoanalysts who refer to adopt Lacanian psychoanalysis as an instrument for an hermeneutics (...) of politics. Finally the article develops some guidelines for directing the application of Lacanian psychoanalysis toward the renewal of the conceptual apparatus of political theory. (shrink)

L’articolo si propone di analizzare, alla luce di un esteso scandaglio documentario e di un accurato spoglio delle testate locali, i rapporti fra Pier Paolo Pasolini e il Cineguf bolognese, negli anni in cui lo scrittore fu studente del Liceo Galvani e poi fra gli iscritti alla Facoltà di Lettere, sotto alla guida di docenti come Carlo Calcaterra e Goffredo Coppola. Questa ricerca ha permesso non solo di approfondire la conoscenza della cultura spettatoriale del giovane Pasolini, ma ha anche consentito (...) di ricondurre all’avvio del 1940 la sua prima prova da scrittore per il cinema, e cioè il soggetto Il giovine della primavera, rimasto inedito fino all’uscita dei Meridiani a cura di Walter Siti e Franco Zabagli nel 2001. Proprio uno sguardo inedito alle attività del Cineguf consente infatti di comprendere quanto la vita del circolo poté pesare sulla passione del poeta per il grande schermo, spingendolo a provarsi nelle vesti di sceneggiatore. (shrink)

Il magistero aristotelico nella zoologia comparata rimane saldo fino a tempi di scienza moderna, perché non muta in sostanza nei secoli il metodo aristotelico costituito dalla combinazione dei dati anatomici con quelli fisiologici. Pertanto la straordinaria stabilità assunta dalla biologia aristotelica richiede una riflessione sulle fonti storiche di essa e sui fondamenti del metodo scientifico impiegato da Aristotele nel quadro del suo pensiero biologico presentato in maniera complessiva nelle opere De partibus animalium e Historia Animalium. La riflessione su alcuni aspetti (...) del suo pensiero biologico, ovvero sulla questione della causalità, della sostanza, del metodo dicotomico e comparativo, possa spiegare anche come esse abbiano a un certo punto svolto un ruolo di stimolo e di verifica anche per i temi più generali del suo pensiero filosofico. In effetti, con Aristotele il sapere teoretico della biologia ha conquistato per la prima volta in modo sistematico il grande terreno della natura vivente. Un grande merito di Aristotele filosofo e biologo è quello di aver fondato la scienza della biologia e la filosofia della biologia. (shrink)

È ormai evidente da tempo che le democrazie si trovano in grande difficoltà quando devono affrontare la questione del cambiamento climatico. Ciò ha fatto sorgere una tendenza che si potrebbe definire «eco-autoritaria», basata sulla convinzione che la portata del problema sia tale da richiedere, in certi casi, la sospensione di alcune delle regole democratiche. A questo orientamento si oppone il cosiddetto «paternalismo libertario», secondo il quale è invece possibile strutturare il contesto decisionale in modo da spingere gli individui a (...) compiere scelte orientate in senso ambientalista senza ledere la loro libertà. La tesi dell’articolo è che una risposta ai problemi posti da entrambi gli schieramenti possa essere individuata in una concezione deliberativa della democrazia, che si alimenta del rapporto di vicendevole scambio tra la formazione istituzionale della volontà e un’informale formazione dell’opinione e delle idee. (shrink)

Attraverso lo studio di due singolari planimetrie inedite e non datate viene fatta luce su una pagina sconosciuta della museologia palermitana: la proposta, mai attuata, di Antonino Salinas, appoggiata anche da Giuseppe Fiorelli e da Paolo Boselli, di trasferire tra il 1887 ed il 1910 tutte le raccolte archeologiche, di arte medievale e moderna dai locali dell’ex convento dei padri Filippini all’Olivella nel complesso medievale di Palazzo Chiaramonte o Steri. L’infelice scelta post-unitaria di destinare l’ex convento a sede del Museo (...) di Palermo, l’Esposizione Nazionale del 1891/1892 ed il “taglio” della via Roma, praticato nei primi anni del ‘900 per la realizzazione della nuova grande arteria cittadina, sono i moventi, che sollecitano gli attori della vicenda a sollevare la questione. La ricerca documentale, che descrive gli eventi sino al 1932, svela molte delle dinamiche e delle problematiche inerenti ai fatti come la possibile costituzione di un nuovo polo museale, una suggestiva area urbana riqualificata, che risulta quasi un intero quartiere dedicato ai musei. Il nuovo progetto espositivo del Salinas è in linea di continuità con la ben nota idea dell’archeologo palermitano di celebrare la “storia delle arti di tutta la Sicilia” ed allo stesso tempo anticipa alcune delle scelte espositive, che saranno adottate in seguito dal Marconi e dall’Accascina: un unicum tra i coevi musei nazionali della penisola. (shrink)

Oggi il libro elettronico imita il libro a stampa come i primi incunaboli imitavano i manoscritti, l’esplosione delle modalità di comunicazione elettroniche è altrettanto rivoluzionaria di quello che fu l’invenzione della stampa a caratteri mobili centinaia di anni fa, e il lettore contemporaneo ha altrettante difficoltà ad assimilare gli e-book di quante ne ebbero i lettori del Quattrocento a familiarizzare con gli incunaboli. Siamo in un periodo nel quale testo a stampa e testo digitale coesistono e sicuramente continueranno a farlo (...) per qualche altro tempo ancora. Non pretendiamo dunque a tutti i costi di analizzare in termini dualistici ( o carta o digitale ) un fenomeno che è ancora in corso e basandoci invece su quello che ci insegna la storia del libro proviamo piuttosto a riconoscere che oggi stiamo assistendo a un cambiamento che almeno per un verso è effettivamente inedito perché, per la prima volta nella storia, avviene simultaneamente su più piani, con la trasformazione contemporanea del supporto della scrittura, della tecnica della sua riproduzione, delle modalità della sua diffusione e infine dei modi di leggere. Tutto il circuito della comunicazione editoriale classicamente intesa è messo in discussione e con il digitale il mercato librario è destinato a crescere, ma attraverso una grande mutazione delle sue logiche di funzionamento. Today, the e-book imitate the printed book exactly as the first incunabula once imitated the manuscripts; the explosion of the electronic communication is just as revolutionary as it was the invention of the movable type printing hundreds of years ago; and the contemporary reader is facing, with the e-book, the same difficulty than the readers of the fifteenth century have had with the incunabula. We are in a period in which paper and digital definitely coexist and they surely will continue to do it for a few more years to come. So, rather than insisting on analyze in dualistic terms (or paper or digital) a phenomenon that is still in progress, and relying instead on what we learn from the history of the book, we should try to recognize that today we are witnessing a change that at least in one way is actually different because, for the first time in history, it takes place at the same time on several levels, with the simultaneously transformation of the writing's media , the technique of its reproduction, the way of its spread , and finally the practice of reading . The classic communication circuit is being revisited, and the editorial market is meant to grow in the digital era, but throughout a big change in its behavior. (shrink)

The article analyses some aspects of Schmitt’s theories on international law, in particular the notion of Gro ß raum. The assumption is that with this notion Schmitt tries to re-think politics and international relations beyond the classical categories of the State. From this point of view, there is an essential affinity between the concept of politics explained in the homonymous essay published in 1927 and the concept of Gro ß raum. After the Second World War, Schmitt distances himself from the (...) notion of Gro ß raum, too close to the nazi theories, and focuses on that of nomos, explained in Der Nomos der Erde, and on the crisis of the Jus publicum europaeum. However, Schmitt fails to define which system of international relations should follow the Jus publicum europaeum and the same notion of nomos remains rather undefined. In the last part of the paper the author compares Schmitt’s theories about international law and some theories of Kelsen, with particular reference to the theory of bellum justum. (shrink)

La metafisica di tradizione aristotelica e scolastica, lungo il corso del XVI secolo, ha vissuto un periodo di grande approfondimento. In questo lasso di tempo gli autori di quella che poi sarebbe stata definita "Seconda Scolastica" avanzarono soluzioni nuove, seppure presentate come tradizionali, alle questioni che nei secoli precedenti avevano costituito l'impalcatura dell'intero aristotelismo. In particolare, fu il tentativo dei primi Dottori della Compagnia di Gesù di rendere "moderna", e quindi adeguata ai tempi, la tradizione aristotelica, quello che nei (...) secoli a seguire avrebbe manifestato maggiore pervasività. All'alba della storia dell'Ordine Toledo, Perera e Fonseca con i commenti alle opere dello Stagirita, ma anche con l'organizzazione di un nuovo metodo di docenza e con la stesura di veri e propri manuali di studio, diedero vita ad un vero e proprio paradigma che avrebbe coinvolto tutte le espressioni culturali possibili dalla letteratura, all'arte fino al teatro. (shrink)

Cento anni dopo il volume di E. Ciaceri, Culti e miti nella storia dell’antica Sicilia (Catania, 1911), l’opera di Roberta Rizzo si presenta come un utile strumento di studio per chi voglia conoscere il versante siciliano della mitologia antica. Più di trecento lemmi, disposti in ordine alfabetico e divisi in capitoli per ciascuna lettera dell’alfabeto, trattano di divinità ed eroi che in qualche modo — più o meno direttamente — sono connessi alla mitologia ed ai culti documentati nella grand...

I temi discussi all’interno del volume sono il frutto di una intensa attività seminariale svolta all’interno dei corsi di Filosofia politica e di Storia delle dottrine politiche presso il Dipartimento di Scienze politiche dell’Università di Roma Sapienza. Ha tra i suoi obiettivi quello di introdurre allo studio e alla comprensione di alcuni argomenti che sono al centro della politica e sono volti al compimento del grande progetto politico che vede nella libertà i luoghi della felicità e della solidarietà. (...) Dalla riflessione che ne è scaturita è emersa la convinzione che alla base di questo progetto la democrazia continua ad essere, nonostante le sue criticità, un valore attuale e uno strumento fondamentale per la convivenza pacifica tra i popoli, in un epoca in cui la libertà si è riconciliata con l’uguaglianza assumendo il significato di fonte di legittimazione democratica che oggi si ripropone a tutela delle differenze che fanno «di ciascuno di noi un individuo unico». (shrink)

Gianfranco Ravasi ha voluto "ripensare" ciò che era già stato indagato e meditato durante la lunga avventura del pensiero umano, a partire dalle culture primitive e dalle antiche civiltà. E ha analizzato le due sorgenti che alimentano il concetto occidentale di anima: le Sacre Scritture e la cultura greca, con i miti di Psiche e di Orfeo e pensatori come Platone, Aristotele e Plotino. Giunti alla fine di questa riflessione ci si rende conto che la storia dell'anima coincide con (...) la storia dell'uomo, creatura di Dio. E un dubbio affiora: che l'agitarsi febbrile dell'umanità contemporanea non sia un avanzare ma un insensibile retrocedere, o uno strano volteggiare sempre sullo stesso spazio, e che proprio “l'anima, con la sua fame di eterno e di infinito” sia ciò che invece ci costringerà a muoverci “sempre oltre, verso un Oltre illimitato”. (shrink)

Il presente studio indaga lo sviluppo della dottrina teologica degli Atomisti antichi, secondo cui gli dèi esistono, ma non si occupano in tutto o in parte di noi umani. Ritenuta per lungo tempo espressione di ateismo, essa è presentata qui come una teoria filosofica solida ed eticamente rilevante, perché offre una concezione positiva della natura divina. Il volume compie un’indagine sistematica dei testi teologici degli Atomisti, partendo dai frammenti di Democrito e di Epicuro, fino agli scritti degli Epicurei di età (...) romana, come Demetrio Lacone e Filodemo, preservati soprattutto dai papiri di Ercolano. Oltre alle immancabili somiglianze che intercorrono tra questi autori, si sottolineano anche alcune profonde differenze tra le loro idee. In particolare, si propone l’ipotesi che esistano tre “teologie”, o meglio tre varianti teologiche, nell’Atomismo antico: l’idea di Democrito che gli dèi sono mortali e aiutano gli uomini saggi; la concezione di Epicuro, che stima dio un vivente del tutto indifferente alle vicende umane e dedito alla sola contemplazione di sé; la variante degli Epicurei successivi, che considera la divinità come dedita ad azioni e occupazioni che non ledono la sua perfezione. Attraverso le loro ipotesi sulla divinità, gli Atomisti individuano, inoltre, alcuni modelli di beatitudine, al quale l’essere umano deve cercare di assimilarsi per vivere felicemente. Sulla base di tale ulteriore proposta, si ricavano alcune potenziali ricadute morali delle teologie atomiste e si suggerisce che queste possano proporre alternative “stranianti” di pensiero / di prassi, capaci di influire costruttivamente sulle nostre vite. (shrink)

Il corso sulla Storia dell'idea di tempo, tenuto al Collège de France nel 1902-1903, per la prima volta tradotto interamente in italiano, è dedicato al concetto di tempo nella storia della filosofia antica e moderna. In queste straordinarie lezioni Bergson si confronta con Platone, Aristotele, Plotino, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton e Kant. Nel cuore della metafisica occidentale il filosofo francese intravede una fondamentale negazione del tempo, impropriamente considerato come imitazione e riduzione di un’originaria eternità, inattingibile nell’immediato e (...) esperibile solo per il tramite di un apparato simbolico. Alla luce di questa paradossale “falsa partenza” del pensiero occidentale, Bergson indica nella storia della metafisica la costante riproposizione dei suoi errori fondativi; ma vi intravede anche l’inesorabile cammino concettuale che, progressivamente, riconduce il tempo alla sua natura psicologica, quella della durata. (shrink)

Danto’s philosophy of history of art has undergone several transformations. It is possible to distinguish three “phases”: in the first, history is considered an a posteriori construction (see Analytical Philosophy of History). In the second phase, history becomes an internal development within art itself. In this case, with the end of history, art dissolves into its own philosophy (see The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art). In the third phase, history is still an internal development, but now, with the end of history, (...) art and philosophy become independent of each other (see After the End of Art). This essay focuses on two issues: first, on the difficulties of an art history after the end of the history of art; secondly, for what reasons Danto claims that the history of art is ended. Danto has explained the “political” reasons for this choice, namely the attempt to free art from the repressive and disenfranchising moves of philosophy. This essay aims to outline the epistemic reasons: the history of art “must” end, because only on this condition is an essentialist definition of art really possible. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, Storia delle antiche teologie atomiste, est le fruit de la réélaboration d’une thèse de doctorat en philosophie rédigée et soutenue en 2016 par son auteur, Enrico Piergiacomi, à l’Université de Trente. L’objectif principal de ce travail transparaît déjà dans son titre : il s’agit, en effet, de chercher si et en quels termes il est légitime de parler de « théologies atomistes », et d’en reconstituer l’histoire. Cette étude vise à démontrer non seulement que la réflexion atomiste (...) s... (shrink)

Nella storia del pensiero non è infrequente il caso di opere capitali circolate mutile. A volte per ragioni estrinseche, più spesso per motivi riconducibili a conflitti agiti, patenti o sotterranei che siano. Quando i testi vengono infine reintegrati, non si compie solo un dovere restitutivo: le idee tornano a vivere nella loro pienezza. Di una simile vicenda Individuo e cosmo nella filosofia del Rinascimento offre un esempio paradigmatico. Alla sua pubblicazione nel 1927, al culmine della elaborazione teoretica di Ernst (...) Cassirer maturata nella cerchia amburghese di Aby Warburg, fu subito chiaro come il Rinascimento assumesse una fisionomia nuova, plurivoca e tutt'altro che pacificata. Attraverso le nozioni di individuo e cosmo - quello interiore compendiato dal microcosmo e quello fisico, a cui l'uomo appartiene e da cui è trasceso - venivano alla luce i nuclei etici e conoscitivi della modernità, quali i rapporti tra libertà e necessità e tra soggetto e oggetto. Dalla ricchissima trama di idee, riflessioni e congetture che Cassirer riusciva a intessere attingendo non solo a filosofi, ma anche a scienziati, poeti e retori, si distaccavano per rilievo peculiare i contributi di pensiero di due figure, il tedesco Niccolò Cusano e il francese Charles de Bovelles. A sottolineare la loro centralità, Cassirer poneva in appendice il dialogo Della mente del primo e Il sapiente del secondo, con le splendide figure dell'edizione originale del 1510. Entrambi gli scritti risultavano però espunti nella traduzione italiana di Individuo e cosmo nella filosofia del Rinascimento apparsa nel 1935, in un clima gentiliano che promuoveva una visione tutta italocentrica della Rinascenza. Oggi, dopo che i miti di autoctonia e di supremazia spirituale si sono sgretolati, recuperare l'interpretazione cosmopolita di un'epoca fondante della storia culturale europea ha una valenza che esorbita dal puro ambito storiografico. La prima traduzione integrale, e completamente rifatta, del testo di Cassirer risponde a un'esigenza del nostro tempo: rompere con le prospettive unilaterali. Perché «ogni genio autenticamente grande, vale a dire ogni genio nazionale nel senso più profondo, ci costringe subito ad abbandonare un punto di osservazione così limitato». (shrink)